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Abstract 
In much of the academic literature drug prohibition is often described as an American, 
or at least a Western, construct. This paper shows how prohibitions were enforced in 
Asian countries while the United States and Western Europe were routinely trading 
opium. The concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is, therefore, 
flawed. Furthermore, Western missionaries to China are often credited as important 
actors in the formulation of Western prohibitions. These missionaries may, however, 
have been influenced by the prohibitionist ideals of the peoples they were trying to 
convert to Christianity. This paper does not dispute the importance of American 
pressure on the global spread of prohibition but rather seeks to add balance to its 
historiography, by elucidating how Western prohibitions were pre-dated, and possibly 
influenced, by Eastern prohibitions. 
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Introduction 
In much of the academic literature drug prohibition is often described as an American, 
or at least a Western, construct. This article shows how prohibitions were enforced in 
Asian countries while the United States and Western Europe were routinely trading 
opium. The concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is, therefore, 
flawed. The second part of the article evaluates the potential influence Eastern 
prohibitionists had upon Western missionaries, who are often credited as important 
actors in the formulation of prohibition in the West. 
This article does not dispute the importance of the United States and Western 
European countries in renovating prohibition to conform to a more globalised world. 
While the United States may not have constructed prohibition, it did globalise its 
prohibitionist policies and the preventive measures it employs against drugs.1 It may 
even be that global prohibition is a ‘US dream’,2 however, this is not the same as 
national prohibition being an American construct. By showing how Western 
prohibitions were pre-dated, and possibly influenced by, Eastern prohibitions this 
article will provide a more nuanced perspective on both global and national 
prohibitions, thus adding balance to the historiography of prohibition. 
The first section provides the central arguments of what could be termed the 
‘prohibition as an American construct’ thesis. This is followed by six case studies 
detailing the origins of prohibitions of opium and opiates in: the United States; Siam 
(Thailand); Burma; Japan; Viet Nam; and China. The article focuses primarily on 
opium and opiate prohibitions, as it was the first drug of international concern and the 
impetus to the current international drug-control regime. The final section discusses 
the potential influence Chinese prohibitionists had upon Western missionaries, who in 
turn influenced Western prohibitions. 
 
The ‘prohibition as a US construct’ thesis 
Ethan Nadelmann, one of the principle proponents of the ‘prohibition as an American 
construct’ thesis, argues that norms forming the foundation of the global drugs-
prohibition regime are rooted in Western Europe and the United States.3 That is, 
international legal regulations governing what is globally considered 
acceptable/deviant have been driven by the morality of Western Europe and the 
United States: 
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[T]he nature of the global drug control regime reflected the 
predominance of the United States and Europe in establishing global 
norms concerning the selection and appropriate uses of psychoactive 
substances. Some Asian states, for instance, might have opted for a 
different global regime that legitimized the use of opium [however] 
. . . the global drug enforcement regime reflected the desire and 
capacity of the United States to impose its drug-related norms on the 
rest of the world.4 
 
For Nadelmann, global regimes begin life with ‘moral entrepreneurs’ in one 
country mobilising popular and political support for their idea. They then 
communicate and co-operate with moral entrepreneurs in other countries, possibly 
joining together to persuade foreign audiences that their prohibition is cosmopolitan 
rather than national.5 
The global drug-prohibition regime was influenced heavily by moral 
entrepreneurs in nineteenth-century Britain and the United States, including religious 
missionaries who had lived and worked in China.6 The motivation for missionary 
opposition to opium is usually seen as a mixture of morality7 and professional self-
interest: missionaries used opium as a scapegoat for their failures to convert the 
Chinese to Christianity.8 As will be discussed later in the paper, some missionaries 
may, however, have learnt prohibition from the peoples they were trying to convert. 
Many missionaries formed, or supported, groups of moral entrepreneurs in the 
United States and the United Kingdom to lobby Western countries to cease exporting 
opium to China,9 the assumption being that reducing the availability of opium would 
prevent consumption.10 Arnold Taylor suggests that their role was important in: 
 
… evoking the inauguration of the [anti-opium] movement, and in 
promoting the early work once the movement had been started, that 
in its early stages the international campaign might quite 
appropriately be referred to as a missionary movement or better still, 
as missionary diplomacy.11 
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Gregory Blue refers to them as the ‘most consistent and ultimately the most 
influential source of opposition’ to the foreign trade in, and domestic consumption of, 
opium.12 Missionaries provided pressure groups in the United States and the United 
Kingdom with evidence of the harmful effects of opium on Chinese consumers and 
their communities, often in the form of pamphlets, newspaper articles, sermons, or 
public lectures. These communications from missionaries were influential in the 
development of a ‘compassion for China’s opium-addicted masses’ in the United 
States and Britain.13 The decision to prohibit opium in the US-controlled Philippines 
in 1905 was also heavily influenced by missionary sources. This said, compassion for 
Chinese consumers only translated into policy in the United States and Britain when it 
dovetailed with economic and political interests.14 
The importance of opium declined during the late nineteenth century for the 
British, whose colony in India provided the majority of opium consumed in Asia. The 
crop lost much of its significance to farmers in the more modernised areas of India, 
resulting in many farmers voluntarily substituting opium with more profitable crops. 
The British Government in India had also begun to diversify its exports, constricting 
opium’s economic significance from the 1870s.15 
The United States similarly first showed its support for China’s sovereign 
right to prohibit opium in 1887 when it banned its ships from exporting the drug to 
China. As the United States was attempting to gain favourable trading status from 
China at the time its support for prohibition dovetailed economic interests.16 The 
linkage of support for Chinese prohibition and national self-interest continued after 
1893 when the United States began to see China as a potentially lucrative market17 for 
US goods and services, whilst also attempting to reduce the European dominance of 
trade with China.18 
Additionally, in the United States and Britain, there had been a gradual shift in 
the perception of opium as a relatively harmless drug to be tolerated, towards one of 
opium as a threat to health and, thus, something to be prohibited. It was believed by 
many that the best way to prevent consumption in the United States and its colonies 
was to prevent the production of opium at the source. For this, the United States 
needed international support.19 In short, supporting China in their prohibition 
dovetailed US interest towards the end of the nineteenth century.20 
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In summary, the success of moral entrepreneurs in lobbying the national and 
international stage was reliant upon a convergence of moral, cultural, political, and 
material concerns.21 As importantly, the move from national to global prohibition 
reflects the United States’ hegemonic status:22 the United States saw global 
prohibition as in its best interest and possessed the influence to affect changes in 
foreign nations, international organisations, and international law. The following 
sections explore when and why prohibitions were enacted in: the United States; 
Burma; Japan; Siam (Thailand); Viet Nam; and China. The article then returns to the 
topic of moral entrepreneurs by discussing the potential effect that Chinese 
prohibitionists had upon Western religious missionaries. 
 
The origins of prohibition in the United States 
The first (non-alcoholic) drug prohibitions enacted in the United States were against 
opium smoking in San Francisco in 1875 and Virginia City (a small town in Nevada) 
in 1876. The first federal response to opium was enacted in 1890 when the United 
States levied heavy duties and restrictions on the import of opium. The 1890 
regulation was limited in scope and insufficiently enforced.23 A number of individual 
states also began restricting the sale of opium and opiates during the 1890s, although 
many regulations were modest and contained significant loopholes.24 
In 1905, the United States passed its first comprehensive opium prohibition in 
the Philippines, one of its colonies. Many Americans felt that the United States had a 
‘moral obligation to rectify what it perceived as the immoral use of narcotics’ in its 
new colony.25 The United States, at the time, however, possessed no federal laws 
prohibiting or limiting the trade and consumption of opium. While prohibition on the 
importation of opium for smoking was passed in 1909,26 prohibition on domestic 
distribution and sale had to wait until the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act.27 
One of the reasons for the enactment of the first federal prohibition was that 
the perception of opium and its derivatives had been gradually shifting from general 
tolerance to consumption being harmful to US society.28 David Courtwright sees this 
shift as resulting primarily from changes in the demographic of the consuming 
population: the perception of harm increased as it become less popular with 
middle/upper-class consumers and more popular with lower/working-class 
consumers.29 
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Frank Dikötter and colleagues see race as an equally important factor in the 
changing attitude to opium.30 There was a fear amongst some Americans – and British 
– that: 
 
… opium dens in Chinatowns in Britain and the United States 
threatened to contaminated the West, with young white girls being 
ravished by sinister Orientals in these squalid places of sexual 
depravity and degenerate racial mixing. China was infiltrating the 
West, taking its revenge on its white persecutors.31 
 
The 1875 San Francisco prohibition, for example, did not ban opium 
consumption, but rather opium-smoking dens, which tended to be frequented by 
Chinese migrants. It was, in short, ‘passed against a specific form of drug use engaged 
in by a disreputable group that had come to be seen as threatening in lean economic 
times’.32 
Moral entrepreneurs (including missionaries) and professional bodies were 
influential in changing both popular attitudes and government policy. The medical 
industry lobbied for prohibition of opium partly as a means to build and secure their 
profession, and profits, against the self-medication of home remedies containing 
opium, and partly due to changing attitudes to addiction.33 There had been changes to 
medical opinion of addiction and the benefits/harms of opium. These changes were 
influenced and supported by reports from medical missionaries on the harmful effects 
of opium.34 Moral entrepreneurs and missionaries were also motivated by professional 
and economic self-interest. Many moral entrepreneurs feared that drug and alcohol 
consumption by the working classes would reduce economic productivity,35 while 
missionaries found opium a convenient scapegoat for their lack of success in 
converting more Chinese to Christianity. 
This said, many moral entrepreneurs advocated sobriety in all its forms.36 
Concerns over opium/opiate (and cocaine) consumption were a small part37 of a 
greater social reform movement known as the Progressive Movement. Many 
Progressives believed that prohibiting perceived immoral acts would change people’s 
actions. While their most prominent campaign focused upon alcohol, they also 
targeted prostitution, gambling, tobacco, cocaine, and opium/opiates.38 
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Alcohol was the ‘first drug to be the focus of a [US] mass movement that 
sought to eliminate its use and prohibit its production and sale’.39 The movement to 
restrict alcohol consumption had developed earlier than the anti-opium campaigns, 
during the late eighteenth century.40 Complete federal prohibition was not, however, 
mooted by moral entrepreneurs until the 1850s.41 This section has shown how the 
prohibition of opium and opiates developed during the late nineteenth century as a 
result of a convergence of moral and material interests driven by moral entrepreneurs 
and medical lobbyists. 
 
The origins of prohibition in the East 
Before Western colonial powers began facilitating the Eastern opium trade in the 
eighteenth century, the religious leaders of many Buddhist societies had viewed all 
intoxicants, including opium, as an obstacle to concentration. That is, opium was 
viewed as an impediment to the primary goal of the monkhood. Buddhist kings and 
elites followed their religious leaders’ prohibitions.42 In other words, Buddhist elites 
throughout Asia had prohibited opium before the West had started routinely trading 
the drug. The following sections will provide details of five cases of opium 
prohibitions enforced in East and South East Asia. 
 
Thailand 
Opium was first brought to the territory which constitutes present-day Thailand by 
Chinese merchants in 1282.43 In 1360, King Ramathibodi I prohibited opium 
consumption and trade. Offenders were paraded around the city for three days on land 
and three days on water. They were then jailed until detoxified and placed on 
probation.44 The prohibition was repeated in 1811 and 1839, when the death penalty 
was introduced for trafficking.45 
Prohibition lasted nearly 500 years until, in 1851, King Rama IV allowed 
Chinese immigrants to smoke opium. Authorised opium dens were established, 
consumers were registered, and the state collected revenue.46 The King also 
acquiesced to aggressive demands from Western nations to end the prohibition of 
imports by allowing foreign companies to supply the state monopoly.47 A 500-year 
old prohibition was partly repealed twenty-four years before the first local US opium 
ban and sixty-three years before the enactment of the Harrison Act. 
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Then in 1908 King Chulalongkorn created a state monopoly selling opium to 
all registered addicts, in a bid to lower consumption.48 While the majority of state-
sold opium was sourced from British India,49 a limited number of farmers were 
authorised to grow opium poppies for sale to the monopoly. Many consumers, 
however, continued to purchase black-market opium from Burma and the Thai 
highlands due to high monopoly prices.50 
Between 1917 and 1920 some government leaders, including the head of the 
Thai Opium Department, planned to prevent lowland consumption by banning licit 
opium cultivation, eradicating opium poppies illicitly cultivated in the northern 
highlands, and interdicting smuggled Burmese opium. They were motivated by the 
belief that opium was having a negative impact on Thai Buddhist culture. The British 
Government in Burma refused to assist in the intervention as they felt it would be too 
expensive.51 While there were undoubtedly actors in the Thai government who would 
have opposed prohibition for fiscal reasons,52 the refusal may be seen as one more 
example of a Western nation blocking efforts to prohibit opium in Asia. 
 
Japan 
The non-medicinal consumption of opium was first prohibited in Japan during the 
Edo Period (1600–1867). The death penalty could be applied to those who violated 
the prohibition, which was considered a matter of national security.53 To limit supply 
the importation of opium was prohibited and in 1858, a Japanese–US trade agreement 
banned Americans from exporting opium to Japan.54 The prohibition continued during 
the Meiji Period (1868–1912) as the political elite wished to prevent Japan from what 
they saw as the weakening of China by opium. A Meiji regime edict in 1868 allowed 
for the execution of drug consumers and anyone providing a Japanese citizen with 
opium.55 
Japan created an opium monopoly in 1897 which limited consumption and 
distribution. Any violation of the monopoly rules could be punished with seven years’ 
imprisonment. To deter would-be consumers the state administered a public 
educational ‘campaign that vilified the negative effects of opium. The campaign was 
successful in gaining public support for the restrictions and harsh penalties.’56 
 
Viet Nam 
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Opium was prohibited ‘almost as soon as it appeared’, in 1665, by King Canh Tri III. 
The prohibition, which preceded the Harrison Act by 249 years, called for the 
eradication of all opium crops and stores.57 
The prohibition was restated in 1820 by King Minh Mang who introduced 
severe punishments for consumption, including forced exile,58 and ordered sons and 
younger brothers of consumers to report them to the authorities.59 In 1824 the 
prohibition was extended by allowing for the punishment of foreign merchants and 
soldiers distributing or selling opium. Then in 1840 the King ordered the death 
sentence for ship owners smuggling opium into Viet Nam and enforced compulsory 
treatment programmes.60 
Law-enforcement campaigns against smugglers and producers were 
administered until 1858, when France annexed three provinces surrounding Saigon 
and ordered the Emperor to pay an indemnity of 4 million silver Francs. An opium 
franchise was established throughout much of Viet Nam to finance the French 
extortion.61 
Between 1858 and 1885 France gradually colonised Viet Nam. As the French 
took authority over an area they would immediately overturn local prohibitions and 
create franchises selling opium imported from British India.62 In 1899, the French 
constructed an opium refinery in Saigon and developed smoking opium, which burnt 
quicker than normal, thus encouraging consumers to smoke more.63 
 
Burma 
The Konbaung Dynasty prohibited all intoxicants and stimulants during the reign of 
King Bodawpaya (1781–1819), who made consumption a capital offence. Like the 
French, the British overturned local prohibitions as they gradually colonised parts of 
Burma from 1852 onwards. The original prohibition was, however, repeated in areas 
outside of British control by King Thibaw in 1880, six years before the British fully 
colonised Burma and overturned the prohibition. 
Demand for opium was minimal in most newly colonised parts of Burma due 
to religious and cultural opposition. The British responded with an aggressive 
marketing campaign, which included agents distributing opium cakes to local youths 
and dipping betel leaves, a more popular drug, in opium. By 1841 opium consumption 
in British-controlled areas of Burma was higher than any province of British India. 
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Britain, like France in Viet Nam and other parts of Indochina, was ‘responsible for the 
spread of opium usage’. Burma represents another example of a Western power 
forcing the repeal of a long-standing prohibition and being ‘responsible for the spread 
of opium usage’.64 
 
China 
While there are records indicating that opium was used in China as medicine during 
the eighth century, it was not until the seventeenth century that it was consumed 
recreationally.65 In 1729, 185 years before the United States passed the Harris Act, 
Emperor Yongzheng (1723–35) prohibited the sale and distribution of smoking 
opium.66 Possession could be punished with up to ten years imprisonment67 and 100 
lashes of a bamboo cane. Merchants and opium-den operators could be sentenced to 
death. Opium-den employees could receive lashes of the cane and internal exile.68 The 
harsh punishments were a response to the belief that opium threatened the ‘moral 
order of the “celestial dynasty”‘.69 
Consumption increased despite enforcement efforts. As the demand for opium 
grew Western merchants began exporting greater quantities.70 In 1780 China 
responded to increased supply and demand by prohibiting the import of opium for 
non-medicinal purposes. Distribution continued due to the vagueness of the definition 
of medicinal; consequently, in 1799 all opium imports were prohibited. The 
prohibition was extended to domestic opium-poppy cultivation in 1800.71 
Regardless of prohibition the British continued to produce and package Indian 
opium specifically for the Chinese market, which was sold at auction to private 
merchants who smuggled to China.72 The British, in short, facilitated the illicit trade 
in opium and undermined prohibition. 
In 1813 Emporer Jiaqing (1796–1820) - whilst repeating the earlier 
prohibitions - characterised opium as ‘poisoning and confusing people’s minds’ and 
suppressing economic livelihoods. Then, in 1822, Emperor Daoguang (1821–50) 
blamed opium for damaging the customs and ‘popular morale’ of the Chinese 
peoples. The Emperor issued a further anti-opium edict in 1830 which described the 
drug as damaging to health.73 
The amount of opium smuggled from India increased. This inflated both 
Chinese consumption and the outflow of silver, which in turn deflated the Chinese 
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economy and further increased opposition to the trade,74 especially as peasants had to 
pay greater taxes to tackle the deficit. Many came to view opium as an alien drug 
exploited by the West to weaken China.75 The Imperial regime and political elite were 
additionally concerned by British influence in China and the corruption of state 
institutions by smugglers.76 
To cut the supply China interdicted opium in transit, arrested dealers, and 
forcefully eradicated opium poppies.77 These efforts were, however, unsuccessful at 
reducing consumption. Then in 1839 the Emperor enlisted Lin Tse-hsu who famously 
decided to tackle opium consumption on three fronts. Firstly, consumers were 
threatened with severe penalties until abstinence was achieved, after which they 
would receive medical treatment. Secondly, Chinese smuggling and distribution 
networks were targeted by law enforcement and stricter punishments were imposed, 
including the death sentence.78 Lastly, the Commissioner sought to cut foreign 
supplies by appealing to the British for support. When diplomacy failed, 
Commissioner Lin interdicted and destroyed 15,000 chests containing approximately 
ninety-five tons of opium from British and, to a much lesser extent, US merchants.79 
As the Chinese market was economically important to British India the 
enforcement of the import ban resulted in a three-year conflict. A defeated China was 
forced to cede Hong Kong and pay compensation for damages done to British opium 
merchants. The illicit trade continued as before, albeit at an increased level.80 
In 1858, the Chinese Government - after fighting a Second ‘Opium War’ with 
the British and French - legalised the importation of opium by including it on a list of 
goods subject to import tariff.81 Then during the 1860s the Emperor approved the 
taxation of opium production in Yunnan to fund the suppression of the Panthay 
Uprising. The Imperial regime, however, remained officially opposed to opium 
consumption.82 Several other provinces followed Yunnan’s example and de facto 
legalisation preceded the official repeal of prohibition in the mid-1880s.83 At the risk 
of sounding repetitive, the import prohibition was repealed half a century before the 
passing of the Harrison Act. 
By 1905 China was the world’s leading source of opium84 and possessed a 
significant consumer population.85 The political elite returned to traditional 
reservations about opium86 by again calling the drug a threat to national productivity 
and health.87 Many saw the history of foreign trade as a sign of Chinese weakness in 
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the international arena. Others saw opium consumers as a limitation on 
modernisation.88 
In September 1906 an Imperial Decree declared the suppression of opium 
production, trade, and consumption.89 By ceasing to export Indian opium to China the 
British Government allowed China to prohibit a trade it had ‘opposed for more than a 
century’.90 The domestic intervention was centred upon a highly repressive 
incarnation of law enforcement which pushed many farmers deeper into poverty.91 It 
was, however, successful in terms of drug policy and in 1917 a Chinese-British joint 
investigation declared all provinces of China ‘opium-free’.92 While the fragmentation 
of the state was to make prohibition unsustainable until after the 1949 Communist 
Revolution opium prohibition remained an objective for many, but by no means for 
all, Chinese politicians and peoples.93 
The five case studies have shown how prohibitions were enforced in a number 
of Eastern states while Western nations were routinely trading opium. Furthermore, it 
has shown how Western powers directly overturned or significantly undermined long-
standing prohibitions. 
 
Western missionaries in China 
As already discussed, Western missionaries were instrumental in constructing both 
national and international prohibition, as part of a larger network of moral 
entrepreneurs and professional bodies. This section asks: could the thousands of 
Chinese who befriended Western missionaries,94 and joined their congregations 
(sometimes to use their detoxification treatments),95 have influenced Western 
missionaries’ perceptions of opium? 
During the early nineteenth century, Western missionaries began proselytising 
Christianity in China. They built schools, orphanages, and hospitals. These early 
missionaries also collaborated in the opium trade. Many legitimately used opium as 
medicine, as was the norm with Chinese doctors. Others traded the drug as a means of 
funding their mission and/or supplied addicts on condition they attended prayer 
meetings.96 A large number simply arrived in China as passengers in ships carrying 
opium.97 Even missionaries with no connection to the trade were perceived as 
culpable by many who failed to differentiate between Westerners selling drugs or 
religion.98 
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Missionaries became aware that the stigma attached to opium and opium 
traders hindered their ability to proselytise when ‘crowds heckled them about the 
opium problem as they attempted to preach in the countryside’. Many missionaries 
were, therefore, reluctant to admit being citizens of countries which traded opium.99 
The drug also became a convenient scapegoat for their failures to convert a significant 
number of Chinese after decades of religious proselytising.100 This said, many 
missionaries no doubt perceived all intoxication as morally wrong and therefore felt it 
their duty to help the Chinese people rid themselves of opium.101 Nonetheless, as they 
came from countries which generally tolerated opium consumption,102 it is possible 
that many individual perceptions of opium were changed by experiences in China and 
interaction with Chinese prohibitionists. 
During the mid/late nineteenth century, many missionaries began to lobby 
their home governments to cease trading opium to China whilst attempting to force 
sobriety on their Chinese congregations. These missionaries were instrumental in the 
spread of prohibition in the West. They came back from China and presented 
evidence they had collected of the negative effects of opium on the Chinese peoples. 
These reports were influential in gradually developing ‘compassion for China’s 
opium-addicted masses’103 and changing attitudes to the harmfulness of opium and 
perceptions of addiction.104 
While many missionaries believed they were culturally superior to locals and 
‘came to change, not be changed’,105 it is unlikely that none were impacted by their 
involvement with locals. Kathleen Lodwick shows how ‘Christians in Britain had 
been lectured on the immorality of the trade by Chinese’ prohibitionists.106 For 
example, in 1881, Li Hung-chang - a leading Chinese bureaucrat and diplomat – told 
British missionaries that the Chinese Emperor was opposed to opium and ‘never 
desired his empire to thrive upon the lives or infirmities of his subjects’.107 
Missionaries also provided a conduit for Chinese peoples to communicate 
their prohibitionist message to peoples and governments in the West by printing 
opinion articles articulating ‘elite and popular Chinese opinion’ of the harmfulness of 
opium.108 Chinese citizens and officials would also write to lobby groups in the West 
to describe the harm opium was doing to the Chinese state and peoples. These 
communications presented domestic moral entrepreneurs evidence to support their 
anti-opium campaigns.109 
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Less politically, Jonathon Spence notes many missionaries who had 
befriended locals simply ‘commiserated’ with them about opium consumption and 
addiction.110 In terms of medical opinion, in 1897, 106 Western missionary doctors 
working in China were asked their views on opium. The majority suggested that the 
Chinese they met generally perceived consumption as damaging to individual health 
and society.111 
Some Chinese moral entrepreneurs established Anti-Opium Societies in China 
to lobby for the reintroduction of prohibition.112 The general argument of these moral 
entrepreneurs was a continuation of the long-held view of opium consumption and 
trade as economically and physically damaging to individual consumers and the 
state.113 
This section should not be interpreted as suggesting that prohibition would not 
have developed in the West without missionary interaction with Eastern 
prohibitionists. As discussed at the beginning of this article, prohibition was the result 
of a convergence of factors. The prohibition of opium and opiates was linked to, and 
possibly an extension of, the Progressive Movement in the United States. The move 
towards prohibition also reflected developments in medicine and, issues of foreign 
policy, racism, and class. It also reflected the economic and institutional self-interest 
of moral entrepreneurs and professional bodies. The lateness of prohibition may 
additionally be a sign of cultural fear in the United States of too strong a state.114 This 
section simply posits that Chinese prohibitionists may have influenced Western moral 
entrepreneurs, who were in turn important actors in the construction of prohibition in 
the West. 
 
Conclusion 
That prohibition is an American construct is difficult to defend when we consider that 
the first American state to prohibit the smoking of opium did so over 500 years after 
Siam (Thailand) first prohibited the drug. By the time the United States first passed a 
federal prohibition, China was on its second round of prohibition: the previous one, 
enacted in 1799, had been systematically undermined by Western powers. 
To conclude let us revisit a quote from Nadelmann: 
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[T]he nature of the global drug control regime reflected the 
predominance of the United States and Europe in establishing global 
norms concerning the selection and appropriate uses of psychoactive 
substances. Some Asian states, for instance, might have opted for a 
different global regime that legitimized the use of opium . . . the 
global drug enforcement regime reflected the desire and capacity of 
the United States to impose its drug-related norms on the rest of the 
world.115 
 
Some Asian states may have sought to keep opium legal; however, the history 
of prohibition in the five cases reviewed suggests otherwise. It was, after all, Western 
nations who overturned prohibitions in Burma and Viet Nam, and undermined 
prohibitions in Siam (Thailand) and China. 
The departure point between the United States and Asian states may be in the 
final sentence of Nadelmann’s quote: the United States had the ‘desire and capacity’ 
to impose prohibition and evolve a national construct into an international one, 
whereas none of the case studies discussed above did. China, for example, was not 
only struggling to impose prohibition on its own citizens, but required the cooperation 
of Western states which had previously obstructed prohibition. (That China never had 
the power - or possibly desire - to spread its construct outwards is a blessing 
considering the brutality of early twentieth-century Chinese opium bans.) 
The United States did not construct prohibition but it did globalise its 
prohibitionist policies and counter-narcotic measures.116 It would be difficult to argue 
against the influence of the United States, and to a lesser extent some Western 
European countries, on the global prohibition regime and, consequentially, national 
laws and responses.117 Since the early 1900s, the United States has been one of the 
key proponents of prohibition on the international stage118 and has used the League of 
Nations and later the United Nations as a vehicle for ‘the export of prohibitive 
ideals’.119 The United States has, for example, helped write and gain acceptance for 
almost all major international drug-control conventions,120 and has successfully 
lobbied for the exportation of US law-enforcement techniques and strategies, often by 
training and/or funding their counterparts.121 
Windle, J. (2013). ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’. The International 
History Review, 35(5), pp. 1185-1199. Pre-publication copy 
 
 
The current international regime may then reflect the ‘the desire and capacity 
of the United States to impose its drug-related norms on the rest of the world’.122 This, 
however, is not the same as prohibition being an American or Western construct. 
David Bewley-Taylor may also be correct that the global regime is centred upon an 
‘American prohibitive model’,123 but again this is not the same as prohibition being an 
American or Western construct. 
A major similarity between the United States and China (and probably most 
nations) is that they allowed ‘realist concerns for wider national interest’124 to trump 
drug-control objectives based on morality, religion, or concerns for health. For 
example, Chinese leaders facilitated the opium trade to fund counter-insurgency 
during the Panthay Rebellion (1856–73) and conflicts during the Warlord Era (1911–
35).125 Many Chinese prohibitionists moved between economic realism and morality 
by advocating the collection of opium revenues in the short term whilst lobbying for 
prohibition in the long term.126 American state organisations have similarly exploited 
the illicit drugs trade to further political and economic objectives in Afghanistan, 
Laos, and Viet Nam.127 Once entrenched, however, the ideology of prohibition never 
really left the United States or China: prohibition remained the official end goal. 
Lastly, by calling the current global drug-prohibition regime a form of 
‘cultural imperialism’128 may be to ignore the Eastern foundation of prohibition. It 
may be cultural imperialism to believe that Western moral entrepreneurs constructed 
the concept of prohibition when a number of Eastern prohibitions against intoxicating 
substances were enforced centuries before the United States Harrison Act. As 
importantly, it is likely that some of the most prominent moral entrepreneurs were 
themselves influenced by Chinese prohibitionists. Or are we to believe that 
missionaries travelled to China on opium clippers and returned opponents of the drug, 
without ever being influenced by the people they were interacting with? 
The somewhat distorted view of the ‘prohibition as an American construct’ 
thesis is best illustrated in the following quote: 
 
In the Asian, African, and Caribbean countries in which opium or 
cannabis use was prevalent, members of the elite tended not to 
partake; indeed, their moral views regarding drug use more often 
resembled those of Western elites.129 
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Corrected, this sentence would read: ‘Western elites’ moral view of drug use more 
often resembled those of early Eastern elites.’ 
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